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Previous research on memory has been done 
largely at the individual level. However, recently 
researchers have become interested in under-
standing how groups recall information (Clark & 
Stephenson, 1989; Hartwick, Sheppard, & Davis, 
1982; Weldon, 2001). One major fi nding from 
this research has been that groups recall more 
information than individuals over a variety of 
tasks (e.g. Stephenson, Clark, & Wade, 1986; 
Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz & Davis, 1989). 
However, when group size is equated for by 
using nominal groups (i.e. groups which do not 
interact, but instead have their non-redundant 
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items summed) then nominal groups recall 
more information than interacting groups (e.g. 
Weldon & Bellinger, 1997; Weldon, Blair, & 
Huebsch, 2000), which is a fi nding we expect to 
replicate (Hypothesis 1). Together these fi ndings 
have led researchers to investigate a number of 
variables that might affect groups’ recall, such 
as: confi dence (Hinsz, 1990; Stephenson et al., 
1986), information type (Stewart & Stewart, 2001; 
Tindale & Sheffey, 2002), retrieval strategies 
(Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997), and 
motivational incentives (Weldon et al., 2000). 
The current research seeks to understand 
how aspects of the personal self (i.e. individual 
traits and qualities) and social self (i.e. identifi -
cation with relevant social groups) impact upon 
group recall. Little research has been done in 
this area and we fi nd its omission interesting for 
two reasons. First, we believe it is commonplace 
for the self to affect group recall. For example, 
team members recalling information about 
past successes might recall information that 
highlights both their personal achievements 
and their collective achievements. Second, the 
self has been relatively ignored in collective 
recall despite its importance in other areas of 
group research (e.g. optimal distinctiveness 
theory, Brewer, 2003; social identity theory, 
Hogg, 2003).
In the following, we explore studies that at 
least indirectly indicate how the personal self 
and social self may affect group recall. First, 
transactive memory (TM) systems (Wegner, 1986) 
occur when group members use knowledge of 
each other’s areas of expertise to coordinate 
group recall. That is, group members may rely 
on each other to store and recall information 
because it falls within their domain of expertise. 
Research on TM systems is connected to the 
personal self because expertise is a form of 
self-knowledge (i.e. I am the expert on taxes). 
Research has shown that TM systems facilitate 
group recall and that either the absence or inter-
ference of a TM system inhibits group recall 
(Wegner, Erber & Raymond, 1991). Second, 
a study by Clark, Stephenson, and Kniveton 
(1990) suggests that the social self might affect 
group recall. They had police offi cers or students 
watch a simulated police interrogation and 
then recall the information either individually 
or in groups. At the individual level, students 
and police offi cers did not differ in their recall. 
However, at the group level, police offi cers re-
called more than students. They explain these 
results by suggesting that police offi cers have 
greater familiarity with the task than students. 
However, we wonder if police offi cers’ stronger 
sense of identifi cation with their occupation also 
may have contributed to their superior recall of 
the information. In the current study we seek 
to examine the impact of the self more directly 
by exploring how variables found to impact the 
personal self (i.e. self-reference effect) and 
social self (i.e. group reference effect) at the 
individual level might also impact upon the 
group level. 
The self-reference effect and 
group-reference effect
The self-reference effect (SRE) is defi ned as 
‘information actively related to the self [is] better 
remembered than information that is processed 
in other ways’ (Symons & Johnson, 1997, p. 371). 
Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker (1977) were the fi rst 
to test for the SRE. They created a self-reference 
(SR) condition by having participants respond 
with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether an adjective 
described themselves and then compared it to 
three other information processing conditions: 
structural (i.e. is the adjective in big letters); 
phonemic (i.e. does the adjective rhyme with 
another word); and semantic (i.e. does this 
word mean the same as another word). The 
prediction that participants would recall more 
SR words than words from the other conditions 
was supported.
Johnson et al. (2002) wondered if the SRE 
could be extended to encompass a group-
reference effect (GRE; i.e. the tendency to 
remember items related to a salient social group 
better than items processed in some other 
manner). They compared an SRE condition, a 
semantic condition, and a GRE condition. (e.g.
are students at X university aggressive) and found 
that both the SRE and GRE conditions were 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(3)
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superior to the semantic condition. Moreover, 
the SRE condition and GRE condition did not 
differ from each other.
Symons and Johnson (1997) concluded that 
two theoretical explanations both contribute to 
the SRE: elaborative processing (e.g. Rogers et al., 
1977) and organizational processing (e.g. Klein 
& Kihlstrom, 1986). The elaborative processing 
view is derived from Craik and Tulving’s (1975) 
depth of processing (DOP) model of memory. In 
the DOP model, self-reference items will receive 
greater elaboration (i.e. comparison between 
items on the list and information already known 
about themselves) at encoding which leads them 
to be more easily retrieved later. For example, 
if participants are asked if they are ‘intelligent’ 
then they might elaborate on this word by think-
ing about situations that tested their intelligence 
(e.g. grades). The organizational approach 
assumes relational processing of items on a list. 
Relational processing ‘can include word-to-word 
associations and associations that emerge when 
words share a common category label’ (Klein & 
Loftus, 1988, p. 6). The connection to the SRE 
is that participants sort and organize memories 
both by associating words with each other and 
by dividing information into either a ‘describes 
me’ or a ‘does not describe me’ category. For 
example, the words ‘angry’ and ‘mad’ might both 
be associated with each other and also with the 
category ‘describes me’. Johnson et al. (2002) 
also thought that organizational and elaborative 
processing may underlie the GRE. 
Although the present study focuses on group 
recall, we expect to replicate Johnson et al.’s 
(2002) fi ndings. Namely, individuals will have 
similar recall for SRE and GRE items and greater 
recall for both SRE and GRE items than semantic 
items (Hypothesis 2). 
SRE and GRE at the group level
Researchers have noted that in order to have 
a comprehensive theory of group memory one 
needs to understand the interplay between 
individual remembering and group remember-
ing (Clark & Stephenson, 1989; Weldon & 
Bellinger, 1997). One approach to examining 
this interplay is to observe whether individual 
level effects transfer to the group level (Weldon & 
Bellinger, 1997). The few studies that have 
examined such a transfer suggest it occurs in 
a continuous manner (Badsen et al. 1997; 
Stewart & Stewart, 2001; Stewart, Stewart, Tyson, 
Vinci & Fioti, 2004; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). 
For example, Weldon and Bellinger (1997) found 
that the depth of processing effect (i.e. items 
given deeper processing are better recalled) 
and the picture-superiority effect (i.e. pictures 
are better recalled than words) occurred with 
both nominal groups and interacting groups. 
Moreover, they found that group interaction 
seemed neither to attenuate nor accentuate 
these effects. Given that a depth of processing 
explanation (i.e. elaborative processing; Rogers 
et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997) has been 
used to explain the SRE and GRE effects, we 
hypothesize that the SRE and GRE will occur in 
both nominal groups and in interacting groups 
(Hypothesis 3).
Attenuation versus accentuation 
of GRE and SRE
Although Weldon and Bellinger’s (1997) 
fi ndings suggest that interacting groups neither 
accentuate nor attenuate individual level effects, 
Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath’s (1997) review 
of the group information processing literature 
suggests that such patterns do occur. We do not 
think there is enough evidence to confi dently 
predict that one pattern over the other will occur; 
thus we offer contrasting explanations about 
why group interaction might either attenuate 
or accentuate the SRE and GRE. 
Attenuation of the GRE and SRE 
Process loss occurs when the actual productivity 
of the group does not meet its potential 
productivity (Steiner, 1972). Social loafi ng has 
been proposed as one reason for process loss 
(Karau & Williams, 1993). However, Weldon 
et al. (2000) investigated social loafi ng in col-
lective recall and concluded that social loafi ng 
could not explain why interacting groups 
recalled less information than nominal groups. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(3)
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The implications of Weldon et al.’s fi ndings for 
the present study are unclear however, since 
their stimuli consisted of a set of unrelated 
words that had no evaluative implications 
for the participants. In the current study, we 
used personality traits which may be more 
susceptible to social loafi ng because of the 
evaluative implications it has for the personal 
and social self. 
Although there are several explanations for 
social loafi ng, we focus on evaluation appre-
hension and production blocking (Diehl & 
Strobe, 1987). Evaluation apprehension occurs 
when group members fail to mention information 
because they fear negative sanctions from others. 
Previous research has shown that for both the 
personal self (e.g. Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, 
& Shannon, 1991) and social self (e.g. Biernat, 
Vescio, & Green, 1996) that individuals want 
to promote a positive identity. The desire to 
maintain a positive identity might exacerbate 
the concerns about evaluation apprehension 
in interacting groups. This increased concern 
about evaluation apprehension might cause 
interacting groups to bias group recall toward 
positive SRE and GRE items and omit negative 
SRE and GRE items, which would have the net 
effect of reducing the total amount of SRE 
and GRE items recalled. However, evaluation 
apprehension should have little effect on 
semantic items because they have no evaluative 
component. In nominal groups, evaluation 
apprehension should have less effect than in 
interacting groups because they never meet 
with any group members. 
Production blocking is when the group mem-
bers are stopped from producing ideas due to 
working in groups. A common example is when 
participants forget the recalled item before 
they have a chance to speak. Although the task 
of group members is to recall information, it 
is possible that in interacting groups, group 
members may stop to discuss items. In particu-
lar, they may be more prone to discuss SRE 
items and GRE items because of their evaluative 
implications, thus slowing down the recall of 
those items: this cannot happen in nominal 
groups since no discussion can take place. 
Accentuation of GRE and SRE 
Hinsz et al. (1997) found that groups tend 
to accentuate individual level information 
processing bias if it is present. For example, 
Vollrath et al (1989) studied mock juries and 
found that groups tended to exaggerate the 
bias of individuals to recall more pro-prosecution 
facts than pro-defense facts in a criminal case. 
Therefore, because the SRE and GRE do occur 
at the individual level, it would follow this line 
of reasoning that groups would accentuate this 
pattern of recall.
The tendency of groups to be more confi dent 
of their responses than individuals (Hinsz, 1990; 
Stephenson et al., 1986) may be one factor 
that helps explain this accentuation pattern. 
Additionally, in some instances, greater group 
confi dence has been associated with superior 
memory performance of groups over individuals 
(Hinsz, 1990). It may be that because both the 
SRE and GRE items receive extra attention during 
encoding (i.e. elaborative or organization) that 
this not only improves recall of these items, but 
also people’s confi dence in these items. More-
over, given the fi ndings that groups tend to be 
more confi dent than individuals, this added 
confi dence for SRE items and GRE items may 
be greater for interacting groups than nominal 
groups, thus facilitating the SRE and GRE in 
interacting groups. 
Collective information sampling 
So far our discussion of the SRE and GRE has 
focused on the total amount of information 
recalled and has made no distinction between 
information shared by all group members and 
information known by only one group member 
(e.g. Stasser & Titus, 2003). This distinction is 
important because it illustrates a fundamental 
way in which individual memory and group 
memory differ. In a group recall, group 
members have the ability to pool their unshared 
information whereas individuals are limited 
to recalling only their personal information. 
Therefore, in this section, we turn our attention 
toward exploring whether the SRE and the 
GRE will occur for both shared and unshared 
information.
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Previous research with decision making 
groups (Stasser & Titus, 2003; Wittenbaum, 
Hollingshead & Botero, 2004) and collective 
recall groups (Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Stewart & 
Stewart, 2001; Stewart et al., 2004) have repeatedly 
found that groups do not pool their resources 
optimally, but instead tend to mention shared 
information more than unshared information, 
which is a fi nding we expect to replicate (Hypo-
thesis 4). Stasser and Titus (1987) offered the 
collective information sampling (CIS) model 
as a probabilistic explanation for why groups 
are biased toward shared information. The CIS 
model posits that groups sample items from 
the repository of knowledge that the group 
members collectively hold. Therefore, because 
more people are aware of shared information 
than unshared information, the group is more 
likely to select out shared information than 
unshared information. 
 Given this probabilistic explanation then one 
can increase the recall of unshared information 
by increasing its salience, thus making it more 
likely that individual group members would 
remember and recall unshared information. 
Several studies have found that if unshared 
information can be made more memorable 
then it is more likely to be recalled (Stewart, 
1998; Stewart & Stewart, 2001; Stewart et al., 
2004). For example, Stewart and Stewart (2001) 
found that when unshared information was 
made more salient by representing it in pictorial 
form, it was more likely to be recalled.
Because SRE items and GRE items are pro-
cessed more thoroughly (i.e. organizational 
and elaborative processing) than semantic 
items, it should have the impact of increasing 
their salience compared to semantic items. 
This leads us to hypothesize that the SRE and 
GRE should occur for unshared information 
(Hypothesis 5). Additionally, we expect shared 
information to benefi t from being self-referent 
or group-referent; therefore, the SRE and 
GRE should also occur for shared information 
(Hypothesis 6). However, we think that the gains 
made in the SRE condition and GRE condition 
should be greater for unshared information 
than shared information. Our reasoning is 
that shared information is already advantaged 
because of the greater number of people who 
can potentially recall it and therefore, the gain 
from making it self-referent or group referent 
should be less than for unshared information 
where only one person can recall it. In other 
words, we expect the SRE condition and GRE 
condition to benefi t both the recall of shared 
and unshared information, but the gain should 
be greater for unshared information than for 
shared information (Hypothesis 7).
The preceding discussion on collective infor-
mation sampling has been based on previous 
research using interacting groups; and thus, we 
expect Hypotheses 4–7 to hold for interacting 
groups in our study. Although collective infor-
mation sampling research has not generally 
looked at nominal groups (see Tindale & 
Sheffey, 2002 for an exception), we believe 
that Hypotheses 4 through 7 will also hold for 
nominal groups. Even though nominal groups 
do not interact and therefore cannot discover 
which information is shared and unshared, 
the bias toward shared information should still 
be apparent. This is because when items are 
summed to create the nominal group score 
it is still true that shared information enjoys a 
sampling advantage since all group members 
can potentially contribute shared items, but 
only one person can contribute unshared 
items. Additionally, consistent with our earlier 
discussion, we will examine whether the SRE 
and GRE are attenuated or accentuated for 
shared information and unshared informa-
tion when nominal and interacting groups are 
compared. 
Consensus of group members
Although not the primary purpose of our study, 
we are also interested in exploring whether 
consensus among group members affects the 
recall of information. Hinsz (1990) noted 
that consensus among group members about 
the correctness of a response is an important 
determinant of whether an item is remembered 
by the group. In the current study, we will take 
a different approach to consensus and examine 
consensus not from the perspective of consensus 
about correctness, but rather consensus about 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(3)
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whether participants endorse an item as being 
either self-referent or group-referent. Because 
we are approaching the idea of consensus from 
a different perspective than previous research, 
we offer no specifi c hypothesis on consensus, 
but will simply explore the research question 
about whether consensus on endorsement 
of an item as self-referent or group-referent 




A 2 × 2 × 3 mixed factorial was obtained by 
varying group type (interacting group vs. 
nominal group), information distribution 
(shared vs. unshared), and encoding task (SRE 
vs. GRE vs. semantic). Information distribution 
and encoding task were repeated measures 
variables.
Participants
Participants completed the study as an extra 
credit project for a variety of lower- and upper-
level psychology classes. Participants were 
from the University of Minnesota at Morris, 
which is a small-sized public liberal arts school. 
Participants were assigned either to complete 
the recall in three-person groups or individu-
ally. Those who completed the task individually 
were later assigned to nominal groups. In total, 
we fi nished the study with 20 interacting groups 
and 19 nominal groups. Eleven individuals were 
dropped from all analyses.1
Material
This study used 108 personality traits from 
Anderson’s (1968) personality-trait ratings. 
We used only items from the top 74% of the 
personality traits to avoid extremely negative 
traits. The items were broken down into six 
sets of 18 items: SRE-shared, GRE-shared, 
semantic-shared, SRE-unshared, GRE-unshared, 
and semantic-unshared. All of the sets were 
balanced in terms of likableness ratings from 
Anderson (1968). In order to control for 
primacy and recency effects, we included three 
buffer items at the beginning and the end of 
the stimulus materials. These buffer items were 
not analyzed. 
The items were distributed so each group 
member received the same 18 SRE-shared 
items, 18 GRE-shared items, and 18 semantic-
shared items for a total of 54 shared items per 
member. For the unshared items, each group 
member received six SRE-unshared items, six 
GRE-unshared items, and six semantic-unshared 
items for a total of 18 unshared items per group 
member. Therefore, at the individual level, 
each group member had a total of 72 items (54 
shared items plus his/her 18 unshared items). 
However, at the group level, there was a total of 
108 items (54 shared items + 18 unshared items 
from group member 1 + 18 unshared items from 
group member 2 + 18 unshared items from 
group member 3).
There were a couple of other features to note 
about the organization of the stimulus materials. 
First, the 72 stimulus items were divided over eight 
pages with nine items on each page (i.e. 3 SRE 
items, 3 GRE items, and 3 semantic items). The 
trait would appear on the left of each page, with 
the corresponding question on the right side 
of each page. Second, shared information and 
unshared information were counterbalanced 
by creating another set of information in which 
shared information became unshared infor-
mation and vice versa. 
Procedures
A maximum of nine participants met in a large 
room to receive preliminary instructions and to 
sign consent forms. Initial instructions explained 
that we were interested in understanding how 
people make judgments about different char-
acteristics of words. It was then explained how 
the experimenter would pace the participants 
through the materials by having each participant 
use a poster board with a window in the middle 
large enough to permit the viewing of one target 
item at a time. The experimenter paced the 
participants through the materials by instructing 
them to move their window onto the next 
target item approximately every 10 seconds. All 
participants were treated the same until they 
were divided into sets of participants that would 
complete the recall individually or in groups. 
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For one third of these items, participants cir-
cled either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ indicating whether each 
target personality trait meant the same thing 
as another word (semantic items). For another 
third of the items, participants circled either 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether each word described 
them (SRE items). For the fi nal third of the 
items, participants circled either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as 
to whether each word generally described UMM 
students (GRE items). After completing the task, 
participants engaged in a 2-minute distracter 
task in which they were instructed to circle as 
many ‘4s’ as they could on a page of numbers.
Participants then were given a surprise recall 
task either in three-person groups or individu-
ally. For individuals, it was explained that they 
had 10 minutes to recall as much information 
as possible from the stimulus materials in any 
order. Additionally, they were asked to number 
their items as they recalled them. Participants 
were also provided with a summary sheet of these 
instructions during their recall period. 
Groups received the same instructions as the 
individuals plus some further instructions for 
the group recall. They were informed that not all 
group members received the same information. 
Additionally, they were told to use a group strat-
egy to recall items and not a strategy that simply 
summed individual responses. Finally, they were 
told that not all group members needed to agree 
that an item was listed for them to write it down 
on the recall sheet. Instead, they were told that 
each group must decide for themselves which 
items to record. Groups were provided with a 
summary sheet of these instructions. 
After the group recall, group members indi-
vidually fi lled out a post-recall questionnaire. 
The fi rst question asked participates how much 
they anticipated having to recall the items on a 1 
(not at all) to 7 (completely) scale. The next three 
questions asked participants how diffi cult it was to 
recall SRE items, GRE items, and semantic items 
on a 1 (easy) to 7 (diffi cult) scale. Participants 
also rated their accuracy of recall on a 1 (very in-
accurate) to 7 (very accurate) scale. Finally, only 
participants in the interacting groups were 
asked about how diffi cult it was to recall either 
‘information common to all group members’ 
lists’ or ‘unique to each group member’s list’ 
on a 1 (easy) to 7 (diffi cult) scale. 
Results
Dependent variable and reliability analysis
The second and third authors on this study 
coded all the recall protocols. The third author 
was blind to the hypotheses of the study when 
coding the recall protocols. Furthermore, both 
coders were unaware of whether items were 
shared or unshared and whether items were 
SRE items, GRE items, or semantic items. Coders 
tallied the number of items that were recalled 
in a given category. They were instructed to 
count a word as correct if it was the correct form 
of the word, but not if it was a different word 
that meant the same thing. For example, if the 
correct word was ‘intelligent’ then ‘intelligence’ 
would count as correct, but not the word ‘smart’. 
Items recalled more than once were counted 
only once in a category. 
The coders coded the protocols for all the 
interacting groups and all the individuals. 
Individual scores were combined to form three-
person nominal groups. Nominal groups were 
formed largely by combining the individuals 
in a sequential manner, so the fi rst three indi-
viduals who participated in the experiment 
would be nominal group 1, the second three 
people would be nominal group 2 and so forth.2 
A nominal group was given credit for recalling 
an item if any one member of the group recalled 
the item.3
The percentage agreement was determined 
by taking the number of items the coders agreed 
upon over the total number of coded items used 
in the analysis. The percentage agreement 
between coders for recalled items was 99.1% for 
individuals and 98.6% for groups. Disagree-
ments between the two coders were resolved in the 
following manner. If the coders disagreed about 
the form of the word (e.g. should ‘domineering’ 
count as ‘dominant’) then a third party, not in-
volved in the experiment, made the decision about 
whether to include the item. If the disagreement 
was not about the form of the word then the fi rst 
author resolved the disagreement.4 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(3)
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Individual recall analyses: Hypothesis 2 
The data were analyzed in a 3 (encoding task: 
SRE vs. GRE vs. semantic) × 6 (form) mixed 
factorial design. Encoding task is a repeated 
measure variable. In order to distribute un-
shared information to the groups, we created 
six forms. Three of these forms were used to 
distribute the original shared and unshared 
information and the other three came when we 
counterbalanced the information by reversing 
shared information and unshared information 
(i.e. shared became unshared and vice versa).
There was a main effect for the encoding 
task (F(2, 102) = 20.41, p < .05, ηp(partial)2 = .29). 
Individuals recalled more SRE items (M = 5.58, 
SD = 2.91) and GRE (M = 4.53, SD = 2.38) items 
than semantic items (M = 2.93, SD = 1.93), which 
is consistent with Hypothesis 2 (simple com-
parisons used Bonferroni tests, p <.05 unless 
otherwise noted). The difference between the 
recall of SRE items and GRE items was margin-
ally signifi cant (Bonferroni test, p < .10). Neither 
the main effect of form (F(5, 51) < 1, ηp2 = .02), 
nor the interaction of form and encoding task 
(F(10, 102) < 1, ηp2 = .08), were signifi cant, which 
shows that the SRE and GRE were equally likely 
to show up on all forms. 
Group recall 
The group recall data were analyzed in 2 (group 
type: nominal vs. interacting) × 2 (information 
distribution: shared vs. unshared) × 3 (encoding 
task: SRE vs. GRE vs. semantic) mixed factors 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Information 
distribution and encoding task were repeated 
measures variables.
Nominal group vs. interacting group: Hypo-
thesis 1 In support of Hypothesis 1, we found 
that nominal groups (M = 5.44, SD = 1.05) 
recalled more information than interacting 
groups (M = 4.38, SD = .78), (F(1, 37) = 12.81, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .26).
Total information recalled: Hypothesis 3 In 
Hypothesis 3, we predicted that at a minimum 
the SRE and GRE would occur in both nominal 
groups and interacting groups. A main effect 
for the encoding task (F(2, 74) = 34.04, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .48) indicated that all three means were 
signifi cantly different from each other: SRE 
items (M = 6.19, SD = 1.85), GRE items (M = 4.82, 
SD = 1.56), and semantic items (M = 3.68, SD = 1.17). 
However, the group type and encoding task 
interacted (F(2, 74) = 3.26, p < .05, ηp2 = .08). 
We did a simple main effect analysis of en-
coding task at the different levels of group type 
and found they were signifi cant for both the 
interacting groups (F(2, 38) = 16.33, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .46), and the nominal groups (F(2, 36) = 
19.31, p < .01, ηp2 = .52). For interacting groups, 
this was due to interacting groups recalling more 
SRE items than either GRE items or semantic 
items (see Table 1). There was no signifi cant 
difference between the recall of GRE items and 
semantic items. For the nominal groups, we 
found that nominal groups recalled more SRE 
items and more GRE items than semantic items. 
The difference between the SRE items and GRE 
items was marginally signifi cant (Bonferroni 
test, p <.10). 
The group type and encoding task interaction 
suggests that the SRE held at about the same 
level for interacting groups and nominal groups 
thus supporting Hypothesis 3. However, the 
GRE was reduced in interacting groups com-
pared to nominal groups thus supporting an 
attenuation hypothesis. There was no support 
for group interaction accentuating either the 
SRE or GRE. These fi ndings were further sup-
ported by our analyses of effect sizes in which 
Table 1. Mean recall of total amount of information 




 Semantic GRE SRE
Group type
 Interacting group 3.6a 4.03a 5.53b
 (1.03) (1.32) (1.23)
 Nominal group 3.76a 5.66b 6.89b
 (1.32) (1.36) (2.14)
Notes: Means in the same row with different sub-
scripts differ at p < .05 using the Bonferroni test. In 
the nominal condition, the SRE condition and GRE 
condition differed at p < .10 using the Bonferroni 
test. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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we compared separately the SRE to the semantic 
condition and the GRE to the semantic condition. 
The SRE appears to be about equally strong for 
both the nominal group condition (ηp2 = .64) 
and the interacting group condition (ηp2 = .62). 
However, the GRE is stronger in the nominal 
group condition (ηp2 = .50) than the interacting 
group condition (ηp2 = .07).
Shared and unshared information: Hypotheses 
4–7 In support of Hypothesis 4, we found a main 
effect for information distribution that shows 
more shared information (M = 6.91, SD = 1.34)
than unshared information was recalled (M = 2.88, 
SD = 1.33), (F(1, 37) = 240.97, p < .01, ηp2 =.87). 
Additionally, information distribution and en-
coding task interacted (F(2, 74) = 10.07, p < . 01, 
ηp2 = .21). We did a simple main effect analysis 
of encoding task at the levels of information dis-
tribution and found that they were signifi cant 
for both unshared information (F(2, 76) = 6.78, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .15), and shared information (F(2, 
76) = 29.81, p < .01 ηp2 = .44). At the unshared 
level, we found that groups recalled more SRE 
items than semantic items (see Table 2). However, 
group recall of GRE items at the unshared level 
did not differ from either SRE items or semantic 
items. Therefore, Hypothesis 5 was supported 
in respect to the SRE, but not the GRE. At the 
shared level, all differences between the SRE 
items, the GRE items, and the semantic items 
were signifi cant. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is sup-
ported. In Hypothesis 7, we predicted that SRE 
and GRE effects would be stronger for unshared 
information than for shared information. This 
prediction is not supported and appears to be 
reversed in the data. Finally, there was no three-
way interaction (F(2, 74) < 1, ηp2 = .01), which 
suggests that our findings for Hypotheses 
4–7 hold for both interacting and nominal 
groups.
Consensus information: Research question 1 
Consensus in this case means how many group 
members during the encoding task circled ‘yes’ 
an item does describe them or does describe their 
group. Although for shared information there 
were four categories, we chose to combine the 
data so that there was either a majority ‘yes’ 
response (i.e. 3 yes, 2 yes) or a minority ‘yes’ re-
sponse (i.e. 1 yes or 0 yes). We do not examine 
unshared information because groups cannot 
achieve consensus on these items since only one 
person responded to it on the encoding task. 
The shared items were analyzed in a 2 (group 
type: nominal vs. interacting) × 3 (encoding 
task: semantic vs. GRE vs. SRE) × 2 (response: 
majority yes vs. minority yes) mixed factors 
ANOVA. Encoding task and response were 
repeated measures variables. In this analysis, 
we report only on effects that involve the re-
sponse variable since we have already examined 
the other variables in the previous analyses. 
There was a response main effect (F(1, 37) = 5.35, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .13), which shows that more shared 
items were recalled if there was a majority of
‘yes’ responses (M = 3.73, SD = 1.06) than if there 
was a minority of ‘yes’ responses (M = 3.19, 
SD = 0.90) to the items. However, this was 
modified by a significant encoding task by 
response interaction, (F(2, 74) = 11.44, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .24). As Table 3 shows, groups recalled 
more shared items in the SRE condition when 
the majority said ‘yes’ than when a minority 
responded with ‘yes’ (F(1, 38) = 30.05, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .44). The difference between the majority 
‘yes’ response and minority ‘yes’ response 
was not signifi cant for either the GRE items 
(F(1, 38) < 1, ηp2 = .001) or the semantic items 
Table 2. Mean recall of information recalled at the 




 Semantic GRE SRE
Information distribution
 Unshared  2.28 2.82 3.54
 (1.28) (1.78) (2.26)
 Shared 5.08 6.82 8.85
 (1.95) (2.27) (2.39)
Notes: For unshared information, the semantic 
condition and SRE condition were the only 
conditions that differed from each other at p < .05 
using the Bonferroni test. For shared information, 
all means in the same row differed from each 
other at p < .05 using the Bonferroni test. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
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(F(1, 38) < 1, ηp2 = .02). Therefore, the results 
suggest that consensus about endorsement has 
an effect for SRE items, but not GRE or semantic 
items. There were no other signifi cant effects 
involving the response variable.
One explanation for our fi nding on consensus 
has to do with favorability of the traits. As previ-
ously mentioned, individuals like to hold a 
favorable view of their personal identity (e.g. 
Skowronski et al., 1991) and social identity (e.g. 
Biernat et al., 1996). It is possible that one reason 
that participants recall more SRE-shared items 
when a majority responds with ‘yes’ than when 
a minority responds with ‘yes’ may have to do 
with likableness of the traits. In order to examine 
this possibility, we correlated ‘yes’ responses 
(i.e. 3y, 2y, 1y and 0y) with likableness ratings 
from the Anderson (1968) ratings of personality 
traits. Table 4 shows that the SRE condition 
and the GRE condition both obtained positive 
correlations. That is, as the item’s favorability 
increased so too did the number of participants 
who said ‘yes’ to it whereas the correlations for 
the semantic items are either nonsignifi cant or 
in the negative direction. Interestingly this shows 
that individuals said that traits with positive 
connotations applied to both their personal self 
and their collective self. However, only in the 
SRE condition did these positive connotations 
seem to translate into increased recall. 
Post-recall questionnaire analysis
Although the post-recall questionnaire was 
done at the individual level, we averaged the 
three-group members’ responses and performed 
all analyses at the group level. Question 1 asked 
participates how much they anticipated having 
to recall the items on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (com-
pletely) scale. An unequal variance independent 
t test showed that interacting groups (M = 1.60, 
SD = 0.81) were equally likely to expect a recall 
task as nominal groups (M = 1.35, SD = 0.50) 
(t(32) = 1.16, p >.10, Cohen’s D = .37), thus 
indicating that we were successful in creating 
a surprise recall task. The next three questions 
asked participants how diffi cult it was to recall 
SRE items, GRE items, and semantic items on 
a 1 (easy) to 7 (diffi cult) scale. Using an equal 
variance t test, there were no signifi cant differ-
ences between the nominal group (MSRE = 3.56, 
SD = 0.83; Msemantic = 5.23, SD = 0.82) and interacting 
group (MSRE = 3.47, SD = 0.85; Msemantic = 4.77, 
SD = 0.98) for the SRE items (t(37) = –.356, 
p > .10, Cohen’s D = .11), and the semantic items 
(t(37) = –1.59, p > .10, Cohen’s D = .51). However, 
the nominal group (M = 3.95, SD = 0.74) found 
it signifi cantly more diffi cult to recall GRE items 
than interacting groups (M = 3.37, SD = 0.79) 
(t(37) = –2.375, p < .05, Cohen’s D = .76). Also, 
participants were asked to rate their accuracy 
of recall on a 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very 
accurate) scale. Interacting groups (M = 4.75, 
SD = 0.78) rated themselves as being signifi cantly 
more accurate than nominal groups (M = 3.79, 
SD = 0.84) (t(37) = 3.71, p < .01, Cohen’s D = 1.19). 
Finally, only participants in the interacting 
groups were asked about how diffi cult it was 
to recall either ‘information common to all 
group members’ lists’ or ‘unique to each group 
member’s list’ on a 1 (easy) to 7 (diffi cult) scale. 
Table 3. Mean recall of shared items at the different 
levels of the encoding task and response
 Encoding task
 
 Semantic GRE SRE
Response
 Majority Yes 2.33a 3.38a 5.46a
 (1.71) (1.66) (1.62)
 Minority 2.74a 3.44a 3.38b
 (1.79) (1.47) (1.74)
Notes: Columns with different subscripts are 
signifi cantly different at p < .05. Standard deviations 
are in parentheses. 
Table 4. Correlation between yes responses and 
likableness for shared information
 Encoding task
 
 Semantic GRE SRE
Group type
 Interacting .00 .51** .52**
 (106) (124) (164)
 Nominal –.23* .57** .58**
 (92) (142) (181)
*p < .05; **p < .01.
Note : The n is in parentheses.
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A dependent t-test showed that interacting 
groups found it easier to recall common items 
(M = 2.67, SD = 0.79) than unique items (M = 4.57, 
SD = 0.91) from their lists (t(19) = 7.06, p < .01, 
Cohen’s D = 2.23). 
Discussion
Before addressing each hypothesis separately, 
we would like to highlight two important 
interrelated trends from our fi ndings. First, we 
consistently found that participants were more 
likely to recall items from their SRE list than 
items from their GRE and semantic lists (See 
Tables 1 and 2). This recall pattern challenged 
our initial assumption that the SRE and GRE 
would have equally impacted the recall of infor-
mation. Instead, we found a series of results that 
we would characterize as strongly supporting 
our SRE hypotheses and showing mixed support 
for our GRE hypotheses. Second, the collective 
information sampling literature is fi lled with 
variables that have failed to increase the recall 
of unshared information. Therefore, our fi nding 
that relating information to yourself (i.e. SRE) 
increases the recall of unshared information is 
a signifi cant contribution to the collective infor-
mation sampling literature.
Individual recall
Hypothesis 2 that an SRE and a GRE would 
occur at the individual level was supported. Our 
SRE fi nding represents a replication of a well-
established fi nding (Symons & Johnson, 1997). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, our study 
is the fi rst replication of the GRE (Johnson et 
al., 2002). Although the GRE was robust in our 
study (i.e. we found it on all 6 forms), it was also 
weaker than in Johnson et al. In the Johnson et al. 
study that used university affi liation (Experi-
ment 1), they found very similar recall levels 
for the SRE and the GRE. However, we found 
that individuals recalled marginally more SRE 
items than GRE items. Although both studies 
used similar samples (i.e. largely undergradu-
ates from lower level psychology courses), it is 
possible that the participants in their study felt a 
greater identifi cation with their university than 
did our participants. However, this is diffi cult to 
determine because neither study took a direct 
measure of group identifi cation. Therefore, 
a future research area would be to examine 
if intensity of group identifi cation affects the 
strength of the GRE.
Group recall
Hypotheses 1 and 4  Our research replicated 
previous fi ndings for nominal groups to recall 
more information than interacting groups 
(Hypothesis 1) and for groups to recall more 
shared information than unshared information 
(Hypothesis 4). 
Hypothesis 3 This hypothesis predicted that 
for overall recall the SRE and GRE would be 
observed for both nominal groups and inter-
acting groups. Moreover, we also speculated 
that it was possible that group interaction might 
either accentuate or attenuate the SRE and the 
GRE. As expected, we found that the SRE and 
GRE occurred at the nominal group level. We 
also found that the SRE occurred in interacting 
groups, but we found no evidence to suggest that 
the SRE was either attenuated or accentuated 
due to group interaction. This fi nding is consist-
ent with Weldon and Bellinger’s (1997) fi nding 
that effects found at the individual level transfer 
to the group level in a continuous manner. How-
ever, we found no evidence for the GRE occurring 
in interacting groups, which shows that group 
interaction did attenuate the GRE.
Hypotheses 5–7 Hypothesis 5 was supported 
for the SRE because groups recalled more SRE-
unshared items than semantic-unshared items. 
However, for the GRE it was not supported be-
cause groups did not recall more GRE-unshared 
items than semantic-unshared items. Hypothesis 
6 was supported by fi nding that the SRE and 
the GRE both improved the recall of shared 
information relative to the semantic condition. 
However, although the GRE improved the recall 
of shared information, groups still recalled 
more SRE-shared items than GRE-shared items. 
Hypothesis 7 was not supported because we found 
no evidence to suggest the impact of the SRE 
and GRE was stronger for unshared information 
than shared information.
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Research question 1 We found that SRE items 
were more likely to be recalled if a majority of 
the group had said the item was self-referent 
than if a minority of the group had said the 
item was self-referent. We found no effects for 
consensus on the recall of the GRE items and 
semantic items. 
SRE and GRE
In examining the data, we believe that the SRE 
was primarily infl uenced by individual-level 
factors and that the GRE was infl uenced by 
both group-level factors and individual factors. 
Therefore, in this section we focus on examining 
the individual-level fi rst followed by group-level 
factors. 
Individual-level analyses There are two pieces 
of information that make us believe that the 
SRE occurred primarily due to individual-level 
factors that occurred prior to recall. First, our 
fi nding that the SRE occurred whether group 
interaction did or did not (i.e. nominal group 
and individuals) occur makes us suspect that the 
superiority of the SRE is not dependent upon 
group interaction. Second, the effect size analysis 
suggests that the SRE occurred with about the 
same strength for both interacting and nominal 
groups. This fi nding is consistent with the past 
literature (e.g. Symons & Johnson, 1997) that 
suggest that the SRE occurs because people 
engage in more organizational and elaborative 
processing of items related to themselves than 
the processing of semantic items. Moreover, it 
is possible that the general superiority of the 
SRE to the GRE is due to participants process-
ing information about themselves more deeply 
than information about the group either due to 
greater knowledge or greater identifi cation with 
the personal self than the social self.
A second explanation is more motivational in 
nature. Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, and Iuzzini’s 
(2002) did a meta-analysis in which they con-
trasted whether people are more motivated by 
their personal self or their collective self. They 
found that people were more likely to defend 
against threats to their personal self than collect-
ive self and more likely to seek enhancements 
of their personal self than collective self. This 
explanation would be consistent with our fi nding 
that the SRE tended to dominate over other types 
of information used in this study. Moreover, it is 
also consistent with our analyses of SRE-shared 
items (i.e. Research question 1) which appeared 
to show a bias toward recalling positive items. 
Namely, participants showed a tendency to say 
that positive items described them and recalled 
these items more when a majority of the group 
agreed these items were descriptive.
Group-level explanation The pattern of the 
means largely suggest that the GRE did not 
have an impact upon the recall of interacting 
groups. This may have been due to some of the 
individual-level factors stated above. However, 
the fi nding that for overall recall the GRE oc-
curred in nominal groups but not in interacting 
groups suggests that there was some form of 
process loss occurring when groups interacted. 
In this section, we explore some group-level 
explanations for this process loss. 
We offered an evaluation apprehension ex-
planation for why GRE items might not be re-
called as often in interacting groups as nominal 
groups. Namely, groups might be biased toward 
recalling positive items and reluctant to recall 
negative items about their group. Consistent with 
this explanation, we did fi nd that among GRE-
shared items that group members were more 
likely to endorse positive traits as applying to 
their group. However, unlike the SRE items we 
found no evidence to support the contention that 
groups were more likely to recall GRE-positive 
traits than GRE-negative traits. 
The other explanation that we offered for 
why the GRE might be attenuated in interacting 
groups dealt with production blocking. On the 
post-discussion recall, we asked how easy it was 
to recall SRE items, GRE items, and semantic 
items on a 1 (easy) to 7 (diffi cult) scale. We found 
that there was no difference between the nom-
inal group and the interacting group for the 
semantic and SRE items; however, interacting 
groups found it easier to recall GRE items than 
nominal groups. This fi nding is akin to Clark and 
Stephenson’s (1989) idea of testimonial validity, 
which is the connection between the correctness 
of a group’s recall and their confi dence. In our 
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study, we would argue that interacting groups 
are showing testimonial invalidity because 
they believe it was easy to recall GRE items, 
but their actual recall does not support their 
contention. 
One explanation for this testimony invalidity 
might have to do with social comparison pro-
cesses (Festinger, 1954; Wood, 1989). Clark and 
Stephenson (1989) argue that one fundamental 
distinction between individual remembering 
and group remembering is that groups are 
more likely to engage in social comparison 
processes as a means of verifying the accuracy 
of their recall. We speculate that groups might 
engage in more detailed discussion and social 
comparison for GRE items because they relate 
more to the group than either SRE items or 
semantic items. This increased discussion may 
lead to increased confi dence that they did a 
good job in recalling GRE items. However, in 
production blocking terms, the extra talking 
about each item may have ‘blocked’ the group 
members from recalling other GRE items and 
thus reduced recall.
Another explanation for not fi nding the GRE 
with interacting groups may have to do with the 
increased salience of the group to which people 
belong during the experiment. As participants 
became more aware of their group identity 
within the experiment, they may have become 
less focused on their affi liation with the univer-
sity, which could have had the effect of reducing 
the recall of GRE items. However, in nominal 
groups, they do not have any competing identities 
because they have never worked in a group.5 
Finally, the one exception for the impact of 
the GRE was for shared information in which 
both the interacting groups and nominal groups 
recalled more GRE items than semantic items. 
However, even in this case, the recall of GRE items 
was signifi cantly lower than SRE items. There-
fore, given the overall pattern of fi ndings that 
suggest the GRE does not occur in interacting 
groups, we think further study needs to be done 
to see if this pattern replicates.
Collective information sampling
As noted earlier, previous research has estab-
lished that groups do a poor job of pooling all 
their available information because they tend to 
focus on mentioning shared information more 
than unshared information (e.g. Stasser & 
Titus, 2003). One implication of our fi ndings is 
that making information self-referent tends to 
increase the recall of unshared information. One 
possible extension of our results would be to see 
if our results apply to decision-making groups. If 
our fi ndings did extend to the decision-making 
groups then it might make groups more likely 
to mention unshared information which could 
also improve their decision-making ability.
We think that another interesting fi nding is 
that both nominal groups and interacting groups 
showed the same bias toward recalling shared 
information more than unshared information. 
We think this fi nding for nominal groups is not 
unexpected and is consistent with the CIS model 
proposed by Stasser and Titus (1987). Even in 
nominal groups, shared information is more 
available than unshared information, thus the 
sampling advantage of shared information over 
unshared information. However, we think this 
fi nding is interesting because it adds to recent 
research which has suggested that failure to 
achieve optimal information pooling may not 
only be a function of problems with the group 
interaction, but also due to individual-level fac-
tors (e.g. Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003). 
Future research
Although the GRE has less impact on the group 
recall of items, we think there are a couple of 
ways in which the GRE might have more of an 
impact upon recall and thus might serve as 
future avenues of research. First, as mentioned 
earlier, the strength of identifi cation with a social 
group varies and therefore it is not diffi cult to 
imagine that, in other instances, group member-
ship may exert a powerful infl uence on one’s 
use of information. Additionally, it may be that 
increased group identifi cation increases confi d-
ence of the group members in the accuracy of 
their recall, which may in turn increase group 
recall. Second, social identity theory (Hogg, 
2003) suggests that when group identities are 
threatened they often are made more salient and 
are more likely to guide information processing. 
For example, the GRE might have had more 
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of an effect in our study if the prestige of their 
school had been threatened in some manner. 
Third, the way that information is encoded might 
affect the strength of the GRE. In our study, 
because we used unshared information, we had 
to have participants complete the encoding task 
individually. It is possible that this puts more 
emphasis upon individual identity than group 
identity, which might explain the superiority of 
the SRE over the GRE. However, if a group was 
asked to encode GRE items together (i.e. the 
group has to make a decision about whether a 
group identity possesses a certain trait) then this 
might lead to a stronger effect of the GRE.
A limitation of our study is that we did not 
collect any process measures. Therefore, future 
research should use videotapes or audiotapes 
to collect process measures to examine in more 
detail how the SRE and GRE affect the recall 
of information. In particular, we think that 
process measures could be particularly useful 
in investigating why interacting groups showed 
signs of the SRE, but not the GRE. For example, 
researchers could more directly determine to 
what degree favorability of the items affects the 
recall of SRE and GRE items. Additionally, we 
have presented several admittedly very specu-
lative arguments about why the SRE uniformly 
increased recall and the GRE had a mixed impact 
upon recall. Therefore, future research that 
directly examines process measures is needed to 
see whether any of our proposed explanations 
might contribute to how the SRE and GRE 
affect group recall. 
Finally, although this study used only one-
word personality traits, we believe our fi ndings 
may have implications for more applied areas. 
For example, two lines of research suggest 
that the SRE and GRE might affect personnel 
selection. First, the interpersonal attraction 
literature suggests that similarity is a factor 
in attraction (e.g. Caspi & Herbener, 1990). 
Second, the Attraction-Selection-Attrition (ASA) 
model (Schneider, Goldstein & Smith, 1995) 
postulates that organizations may end up with 
a homogeneous workforce because they hire 
and retain individuals who are similar to the 
organization. Therefore, we speculate that dur-
ing personnel selection individuals and groups 
might think about SRE-like questions (e.g. Is 
this person similar to me? Can I work with this 
person?) or GRE-like questions (e.g. Will this per-
son fi t in with the organization? Does this person 
share the same values as the organization?). Our 
line of reasoning suggests that future research 
may wish to examine how the SRE and GRE 
affect which information is discussed about 
applicants and whether there are attempts to 
distort information. Additionally, researchers 
might also examine how the SRE and GRE affect 
evaluative judgments of job applicants.
Notes
1. Six participants were eliminated for one or 
more procedural reasons. Some participants 
were eliminated because they failed to keep up 
with the pace of the experimenter when going 
through the stimulus materials. Therefore, it is 
uncertain both as to whether these participants 
saw all the items on the list and how long they 
had seen each item. Participants were eliminated 
if they had been in one of the authors’ classes 
that dealt with the topics of group memory 
and/or collective information sampling because 
it was likely this knowledge would infl uence 
the participant’s responses. Finally, participants 
in the interacting groups always recalled the 
information in front of others and therefore, it 
is possible that social facilitation effects (Geen, 
1989) might increase their recall. Therefore, in 
order to control for social facilitation effects, we 
eliminated any individuals who completed the 
recall alone from the nominal group. Another 
factor that limits our formation of nominal 
groups is exposure to unshared information. 
You cannot put people into the same group if 
their unshared information would be redundant 
because it would make the information partially 
shared. This resulted in fi ve people being left 
over after nominal groups were formed. 
2. We used this sequential process to mirror 
as closely as possible the formation of our 
interacting groups. However, toward the end 
of the experiment there were some minor 
violations of this ‘sequential’ rule due to two 
reasons. First, because as described in Note 1 
some participants had to be dropped, it 
affected our ability to follow this sequential 
procedure. Second, the classes we approached 
for volunteers for this study were largely 
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from freshman level classes. However, we did 
approach one class that was a junior level class. 
From this junior level class, we obtained two 
interacting groups and therefore, we went 
partially out of order to make sure and create 
two nominal groups containing students from 
the junior class. 
3. In coding the nominal groups, we noticed that 
an individual occasionally would recall a piece 
of unshared information that was not on their 
original stimulus list. Given that the instance of 
this occurring was low (M = 0.58 per group) and 
that overall intrusion rates for nominal groups 
were high (M = 9.84), we assumed this was due 
to a group member guessing about a piece of 
unshared information that was not on their list, 
but happened to be on another group member’s 
list. However, in the interacting groups, we could 
not discern this type of information because we 
have only a group recall. However, presumably 
interacting groups would also have items that 
group members guessed at and got correct. 
Therefore, in order to make the comparison 
between nominal and interacting groups fair, 
we elected to code these items as correct in the 
nominal groups.
4. For recalled items, most of the disagreements 
that were not about the form of the word 
involved one of the coders either omitting items 
or misreading items. 
5. We wish to thank Scott Tindale for this 
suggestion. 
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